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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w. Second Edition. By Laurence 
H. Tribe. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. 1988. Pp. civ, 
1778. $38.95. 
I 
Under normal circumstances, publication of the second edition of 
a book about constitutional law, even as important a work as this one, 
would not merit a review. But Laurence Tribe's American Constitu-
tional Law, published in its first edition in 1978, is different. That dif-
ference is not so much a function of the way in which this book 
diverges in quality or even in content from others. Rather, it arises 
from the very role American Constitutional Law plays in the field of 
constitutional law. When we look at that role, we learn a great deal 
about the nature of the subject that is constitutional law, and also 
about the nature of the academic discipline that takes that subject as 
its focus. 
Making sense out of what I have just suggested requires drawing a 
distinction between works that are part of a subject and works that 
comment on that subject. At times works that are part of a subject are 
of such seminal importance that they have in essence created those 
subjects. Consider in this regard the writings of Marx or Freud, or 
indeed almost all literature. To think of the writings of Shakespeare, 
Milton, Zola, Austen, or Dreiser as about literature misses the point, 
for they are literature in just the same way that the Grand Canyon is 
geology, pythons are herpetology, the acts of George Washington and 
Queen Victoria are history, and the decisions of Margaret Thatcher 
and Y asir Arafat are politics. 
Things get tricky, however, for three reasons. First, we often use 
the same word to describe both the subject and the discipline that 
studies it. Government is the name both for what George Bush does 
for a living and for a department· at Harvard University. Economics 
encompasses both the pricing decisions of General Motors and the ac-
tivities of those in university departments who analyze those decisions. 
History is both what happens and the discipline of interpreting and 
analyzing what has happened. Still, this may be little more than lin-
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guistic happenstance. George Bush may be a governor but he is not a 
political scientist, any more than Dred Scott, a historical figure, was a 
historian. Is my mental behavior psychology, or is psychology what 
psychologists study? Here (and perhaps so too with sociology) the lin-
guistic evidence is ambiguous, but my point is only that we ought not 
to let verbal similarities obscure recognition of a tolerably useful dis-
tinction between the process of investigation and the subject of that 
investigation. 
Second, it is sometimes the case that the subject of the discipline 
takes on the role of investigator or commentator, and frequently uses 
the discipline itself as the vehicle for that commentary. Here the per-
spective is one that is often referred to as "modernist," and it involves 
the way in which the painting· of Rene Magritte and the sculpture of 
George Segal and the architecture of Philip Johnson are simultane-
ously painting, sculpture, and architecture and commentary on paint-
ing, sculpture, and architecture. But the role of the participant as 
commentator is merely a contingent feature of some perspectives on 
some disciplines. Again the distinctions have fuzzy edges, but art that 
is self-critical about art is different from art that takes something other 
than art to be its subject. In some way the frescoes of Diego Rivera 
and Jose Clemente Orozco ar~ about art, but they are also and more 
directly about politics and economics. Thus, although sometimes the 
subject of a discipline takes on· the role of self-conscious critic, this 
need not always be the case. 
Finally, and most relevantly, ~he subject of the discipline may at 
times be a book. This is most obvious when the subject is literature, 
but we see the same phenomenon when we consider, now, the role of 
The Federalist, Mein Kampf, Das Kapital, or The Wealth of Nations. 
Books like these occupy a position in history or political science or 
economics not dissimilar to that occupied by flounder in ichthyology. 
That books may be the object of investigation rather than merely the 
medium of investigation is most relevant, of course, because words, 
usually but not always inscribed in books, are the stuff of the law, the 
discipline which it is the role of the legal scholar to study. 
The distinction between words as subject and words as commen-
tary is especially obvious when we consider canonical rules such as 
those found in statutes, regulations, and written constitutions. The 
Uniform Commercial Code, while of course saying something about 
law by its very being, is still primarily an item of, rather than regard-
ing, law. Much the same could be said about judicial opinions. Those 
opinions are most important in their roles as raw material, as the law 
itself, as partly constitutive of law - just as rocks are partly constitu-
tive of geology. 
From this perspective, the legal treatise is an interesting phenome-
non. At some level it is about law, but much more significantly it too 
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is law. The treatise is something that participants in the system, such 
as lawyers and judges, use; it is something that aims to and frequently 
does influence the development of the law itself; and it is something 
that on occasion takes on a status equivalent to or more important 
than some of the more obvious primary legal items. Wigmore on Evi-
dence and Corbin on Contracts are far more significant legal items than 
many cases. Compared to most judicial opinions, they are used more 
often by participants within the system, they have had a greater influ-
ence on the current state of the law, and their citation is likely to be 
more persuasive in most adjudicative contexts. To understand a par-
ticular treatise, therefore, requires that we first understand the role of 
treatises in general in the legal culture. 
II 
In constitutional law, a pervasive phenomenon has impeded our 
ability to see the distinction I am attempting to draw. The phenome-
non to which I refer is the overwhelming normativity of constitutional 
scholarship. With monotonous regularity, law review articles attempt 
to speak to courts deciding today's legal issues, in the hope that some 
legal actor, such as a lawyer, will refer to the article in a legal argu-
ment and persuade some judge (or, more likely, law clerk) to adopt the 
conclusions and analysis the article advocates. When this happens, 
and the article is then cited, the article itself becomes part of the pri-
mary legal material. It also reinforces a decisionmaking perspective 
in which that type of material continues to be treated as primary 
source. 
I am not troubled by this type of constitutional scholarship, and 
indeed have done some myself. Legal academics have every right in 
the world to whisper in courts' ears if they want to, and there is no 
reason that this variety of scholarship should be denigrated. I am con-
cerned, however, about the virtual exclusivity of this mode. "Mere" 
description, explanation, interpretation, or analysis, no matter how in-
sightful, rich, imaginative, or informative, is hardly the preferred 
mode of constitutional scholarship. Rather, the normative mode so 
pervades that scholarship - whether through doctrine (the Supreme 
Court should recognize the constitutional rights of a's to x) or grand 
theory (the Supreme Court should base its decisions on original in-
tent/moral values/text/ context/human rights/political expediency I 
precedent/deference to legislative choice/popular will) - that the 
mode seems essentially to characterize the discipline. 
One consequence of this conflation of the scholarly with the nor-
mative is that it is far too easy to evaluate what is plainly a primary 
work by the standards we would use to evaluate work that seeks to 
explain an enterprise rather than participate in it. When we lose sight 
of the fact that scholarship need not aspire to make short- or even 
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intermediate-term changes in the phenomenon it is studying (How 
often do historians make history?), we tend to evaluate scholarship too 
much by its actual or potential impact on constitutional actors. But 
conversely, to lose sight of the distinction would be to expect of a pri-
mary item that which we should expect only in a quite different kind 
of secondary scholarly analysis. 
III 
As all of the foregoing should make clear, I think it is important to 
view American Constitutional Law as an item of constitutional law 
rather than as commentary upon that field. In part this is a function of 
the way in which treatises have always been centrally important items 
of American law, from Blackstone to Story to Cooley to Corbin to 
Williston to Pomeroy to Wigmore to Scott to Prosser to Davis to Loss, 
and so on. I Now it may be that constitutional decisionmaking in the 
Supreme Court is sufficiently political and sufficiently legally indeter-
minate that the idea of a legal treatise about all or part of that process 
would be questionable. Just as a legal treatise directed to Congress as 
it considers which legislation to adopt would seem a bit odd, a legal 
treatise directed to the Supreme Court as it decides constitutional 
cases would be open to a powerful (even if not ultimately persuasive) 
Realist attack. 2 
But only the most crabbed view of the subject would see constitu-
tional law as solely, or even largely, about how the Supreme Court of 
the United States decides a mere 155 cases a year. Once we compre-
hend the tens of thousands (at least) of court cases a year involving 
constitutional issues, to say nothing of the far larger number of legal 
events in which the Constitution plays a role, it is plain that constitu-
tional law is every bit as treatise-worthy as trusts, evidence, securities 
regulation, equity, or agency. Professor Tribe recognizes this phenom-
enon, and addresses it at the outset of this book. He is properly con-
scious of the fact that the Constitution speaks not only to, and perhaps 
not even primarily to, the federal judiciary, but "addresses its com-
mands ... to all public authorities in the United States" (p. 16). If we 
expect those authorities to treat both the text of the Constitution and 
judicial opinions interpreting that text as law, ot at least as a set of 
rules that constrain them, then treatises about the constitutional text 
as interpreted by the courts would seem to be an indispensable part of 
the subject. Moreover, since most judicial constitutional decisions are 
1. See also??? F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY (1976). 
2. Note that I refer here to the process of Supreme Court decisionmaking and not to the 
output of that process. To think Realistically about the way the Supreme Court makes decisions, 
especially in constitutional cases, is hardly to deny the rule-based doctrinal effect of its decisions, 
any more than to think of Congress as a political body is to deny that the legislation it enacts is, 
and is treated as, law in a decidedly non-Realist sense. 
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not made by the Supreme Court, but by courts we commonly expect to 
treat the output of the Supreme Court as constraining, then once again 
books about that output that are directed in part to those who are 
expected to follow it would seem to be an essential part of the institu-
tion of constitutional law. 
Of course there are treatises and there are treatises. Some are 
merely descriptive, taking their task to be one of organizing, catalog-
ing, and summarizing the law in order to make it accessible to a wide 
variety of users. 3 Other treatises perform this largely descriptive task 
but do something more as well, offering interstitial commentary, cri-
tique, and normative suggestions about where the law, at the margin, 
ought to be going. And still others, while providing both description 
and interstitial prescription, also offer a broad-based critique of and 
pressure on existing doctrine, seeking not only to organize the field but 
to make major changes in it. This last-described style is hardly new, 
and part of the reason that Story, Corbin, Wigmore, and others have 
achieved their eminence is precisely that they did far more than collect 
and describe, and were hardly neutral as to important issues, large and 
small, within the fields in which they wrote. 
"Tribe on Constitutional Law" falls plainly in this last mold. 
Although the book is perhaps a bit more disjointed than the first edi-
tion (not itself a grounds for criticism, for it is a mistake to try to · 
impose more order on a subject than the nature of the subject permits), 
it is plainly a book with persuasive but controversial themes. Let me 
offer a few examples. 
Perhaps the most pervasive example is Tribe's explicitly articulated 
and defended decision not to concern himself with issues of judicial 
legitimacy (pp. 12-17). In part this is a function of his laudable dis-
tinction between constitutional law and constitutional decisionmaking 
by the courts, for once we subtract the latter from the former, ques-
tions about judicial legitimacy are largely beside the point.4 But his 
decision to treat questions of legitimacy as essentially settled embodies 
a quite activist view even about contemporary constitutional decision-
making. Given that every judicial decision is a decision not only of 
substantive law, but of that decisionmaker's authority to decide cases 
of that kind, 5 and given that the courts are incessantly deciding cases 
3. The current norms of legal scholarship make it advisable not to cite any examples of this 
genre. 
4. They are not quite as beside the point as Tribe makes them out to be in introducing this 
theme. Given his CQncem for constitutional decisionmaking by nonjudicial actors, his discussion 
of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), pp. 32-42, takes on a special prominence, as reflected by 
the recently controversial issue of how nonjudicial actors should look upon judicial opinions 
interpreting constitutional questions. See generally Meese, Neubome, Lee, Tushnet, Nagel, 
Colby, Levinson, Stick & Clark, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 
61 TUL. L. REV. 977-1095 (1987). 
5. See 'Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing 
Test, 16 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963). 
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not identical to ones they have decided before, issues of decisionmak-
ing jurisdiction logically can never be off the agenda. To so regard 
them is implicitly to assume jurisdiction despite the logical and fre-
quently legal plausibility of deciding against the exercise of that juris-
diction. 6 Thus, it is not that Tribe does not deal with issues of judicial 
legitimacy. It is rather that assertion and defense of that legitimacy is 
a running theme of the book. 
The devotion of an entire chapter to "Rights of Privacy and Per-
sonhood" (pp. 1302-435) is an equally prominent example of Tribe's 
willingness to take sides on fundamental and contested questions of 
constitutional law. Although troubled by the abortion decisions, he 
ultimately finds their basic aim correct (pp. 1337-62), and endorses 
strong judicial protection for the rights to realize a chosen vocation 
(pp. 1373-78), to determine one's appearance (pp. 1384-89), to control 
information about one's life (pp. 1389-400), and to engage in private 
sexual associations (pp. 1421-35). By contrast, he is skeptical about 
constitutionalizing the topic of death and dying (pp. 1362-71), and 
more skeptical about constitutionalizing risk-taking (pp. 1371-73) than 
he was in the first edition. 7 Thus, although Tribe admirably does not 
sign on reflexively to every claim that has been made for constitutional 
protection in the name of personhood, it is plain that he finds the foun-
dations for many such arguments to be sound. 
In the area ofequal protection, Tribe would have the courts, con-
trary to existing law, examine a wide range of governmental acts that 
have a discriminatory effect (pp. 1502-14), and have them examine age 
and disability discrimination much more closely than is now the case 
(pp. 1588-601). In support of these conclusions, he offers a broad-
based theory of subjugation (pp. 1514-21) as a way of distinguishing 
classifications that are constitutionally troublesome from those that 
are not. 
Although Tribe's views can often be seen as exerting pressure on 
current constitutional doctrine, at other times he endorses the existing 
state of the law. For example, he remains unsympathetic to any signif-
6. For example, Tribe endorses rational basis scrutiny for all legislation, pp. 581-86, 1439-51; 
urges at least some scrutiny of laws having a discriminatory effect but no discriminatory intent, 
pp. 1502-14; approves of some first amendment scrutiny for restrictions on commercial advertis-
ing, pp. 890-904; and is comfortable with a rather particularistic examination of a wide range of 
state laws that may affect interstate commerce, pp. 408-41. Every one of these conclusions could 
have been otherwise without jeopardizing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137 (1803), or 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and thus every one of these conclu-
sions involves the rejection of the view that it' would be unwise in a majoritarian system for the 
courts to be as intrusive in reviewing legislation as each of these doctrines allows. I have no 
quarrel with Tribe's rejection, but I do quarrel with the implicit argument that we can easily 
separate what the courts should do with whether they should do anything. Thus, my objection is 
to Tribe's descriptive claim that he does not stress issues of legitimacy in the book. Issues of 
legitimacy pervade every page, for they are embedded in most constitutional decisions and in 
Tribe's conclusions about them. 
7. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 938-41 (1978). 
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icant constitutional scrutiny for government speech, finding the ex-
isting nonscrutiny preferable to the arguments of those who would 
have it otherwise (pp. 804-14). Similarly, he comes down tentatively 
in favor of the unconstitutionality of the Indianapolis anti-pornogra-
phy ordinance, 8 resists efforts to expand greatly the existing degree of 
scrutiny under the Takings Clause (pp. 588-607), and is comfortable 
with the current expansiveness of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause. 9 
Obviously it is not my aim to provide a survey of every position 
Tribe takes or to analyze the relationship between his positions and 
existing doctrine. I offer these examples only to show that on virtually 
every issue Tribe discusses, he has a normative posture. Sometimes 
that posture is stronger than at others, sometimes it is consistent with 
existing law and sometimes not, but Tribe is never a passive describer. 
Tribe the commentator, Tribe the evaluator, and Tribe the advocate 
are constant presences throughout the book. 
IV 
Given that Tribe is constantly speaking to and attempting to per-
suade the reader, it is interesting to examine the voice with which he 
speaks, and, relatedly, the reader to whom he appears to be speaking. 
The questions of voice and audience, however, are intimately tied to 
this book's role as internal to the enterprise of constitutional law. In 
part the book speaks to those who are somewhat receptive to its argu-
ments, in the hope that they will become more receptive and take the 
book as authoritative support for views that may have existed, albeit 
inchoately, prior to hearing what Tribe has to say. The book plainly 
will not persuade Chief Justice Rehnquist to embrace a wide variety of 
rights emanating from the concept of personhood. On the other hand, 
it may partly persuade, and, more significantly, warrant, other Justices 
to embody some views of constitutional doctrine they may already 
have. If I am right about this book's authoritative status, then "Pri-
vate sexual association is protected. L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 1421-35 (1988)" is a better citation than "Private sexual 
association is protected," and as a result there may be some cases in 
which Justices inclined to this view will embody it if they can say the 
former but not if they can say only the latter. 
This is of course too crude a causal model. More realistically, 
sources embark on a journey toward authoritativeness first by being 
8. Pp. 921-28. Interestingly, however, he appears, equally tentatively, to be sympathetic to 
some narrowly drawn damage awards on behalf of those who suffered psychic trauma as a result 
of events such as the march of the Nazis in Skokie. P. 856. 
9. Pp. 305-17. However, Tribe appears to extract more of a requirement of a clear statement 
on the part of Congress, pp. 316-17, than a few cases in the criminal law area would seem to me 
to justify. · 
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mentioned in a comparatively superfluous way. But once they are 
mentioned, even if it is only in passing, they begin to take on an au-
thority that may, over a long enough period, be more ·meaningfully 
incorporated into some number of judicial opinions, even determining 
the result in some. 10 To put it differently, books like Tribe's may make 
arguments permissible that previously were impermissible.1 1 For 
some time those arguments may lose, but as legitimate losers they may 
eventually influence decisionmaking in the long term more than illegit-
imate arguments that fall outside the playing field of permissible con-
stitutional argumentation. 
If we depart from the realm of the Supreme Court, but stay within 
the realm of the judiciary, we might consider the voice with which this 
book speaks to lower court judges and to the lawyers who argue before 
them. Here the nature of the book becomes a bit more puzzling. 
More specifically, one might expect a treatise to contain a moderately 
comprehensive description of lower court cases. But although Tribe is 
somewhat better at recognizing the relevance of lower court cases as 
part of constitutional law than are most others who write comprehen-
sively about the field, 12 this remains a book that concentrates over-
whelmingly on Supreme Court decisions. In this respect it is not only 
unlike Wigmore and Corbin, ·but even unlike some number of books 
dealing with constitutional issues, perhaps most notably the unfortu-
nately obsolete Emerson, Haber & Dorsen ~ Political and Civil Rights 
in the United States. 13 
This is not to suggest that Supreme Court decisions are unimpor-
tant to lower court judges or to lawyers who appear before them. On 
the contrary, most arguments made by these lawyers are likely to be 
interpretive judgments about Supreme Court cases, and thus an analy-
sis of those cases will be highly useful. Still, however valuable this 
book will be from that perspective, it may disappoint those who expect 
a somewhat more comprehensive treatment of all or even most of the 
relevant case law. 
Conversely, the book is replete with references to the secondary 
literature, primarily law review articles. Again, however, Tribe's goal 
here does not appear to be to attain comprehensiveness, and the law-
10. On this process, see N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978). 
11. This raises a host of interesting complications. If this review had characterized the book 
as dishonest junk (which is emphatically not what I believe), would I have diminished its authori· 
tative status? What if a review written in the Harvard Law Review by Justice Brennan had said 
the same thing? What about a review written in a local law review by a totally unknown begin· 
ning academic? Are book reviews in law reviews themselves internal and not external, primacy 
rather than secondacy? If (and a big "if" it is) a strongly negative review by me in this review 
would have had a negative effect, then have I not done something internal by the vecy process of 
not writing such a review? 
12. See, e.g, pp. 972 n.9, 1050 n.27, 1184 n.38, 1324-25, 1363-70. 
13. N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1976). 
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yer or judge seeking all or even most of the relevant literature will 
have to look elsewhere. But a great deal of the most important litera-
ture is here, and usually not merely in "see also" form. Tribe actually 
uses the secondary literature, often in the course of those many foot-
notes that are sufficiently incisive that they could provide the cores for 
individual articles in their own right. 
Yet for all of Tribe's references to Supreme Court cases, lower 
court cases, and the secondary literature, it is hard to see this book as 
a place to go to find out about other material. It is primarily a book 
one would use to find an enormous array of short, prescriptive analy-
ses on discrete constitutional problems. Lawyers and judges will find 
those analyses useful as introductions to the areas they discuss, as cre-
ative perspectives on those areas, and as persuasively presented argu-
ments for what Tribe thinks ought to be done. Most will want to start 
with Tribe or at least include him in their thinking about these 
problems. Few,, however, will find that this is the only source they 
wish to consult. 
v 
All of this, of course, sounds just like how a scholar would use this 
book - the scholar seeking an introduction to an area she has not 
previously thought about, or a useful perspective on an area with 
which she has some familiarity. When Tribe does not persuade, he at 
least presents a worthwhile view of the problem he addresses. And for 
those who wish that Tribe had paid more attention to the literature on 
and debates about constitutional theory, let us not forget that this 
book is a constitutional th~ory, perhaps at times not presented in the 
professional language of constitutional theorists, but presented instead 
in 1778 pages of demonstrating the theory at work. 14 
Once we see that this book speaks to the scholar in almost the 
same voice as it speaks to the lawy~r and to the judge, can we still say 
that it is a part of corn~titutional law rather than a book about it? I 
think we can, precisely because of the way "Tribe on Constitutional 
Law" embodies many of the conventions of constitutional law as prac-
ticed both by lawyers and by academics. 
First, the scope of the book is defined by the topics that are consid-
ered part of the subject called "Constitutional Law" in American law 
14. The theory that emerges, however, may be insufficiently internally coherent for the prac-
ticing constitutional theorist. At times Tribe's positions seem not to fit together, and at times 
arguments he uses in one area are strangely absent from others. But this may demonstrate that 
his theory is simultaneously a theory of activism and of comparatively particularized approaches 
to particular problems. Given the way constitutional decisionmaking operates within a particu-
larized world, given the way the problems of today are not those of yesterday or tomorrow, and 
given the multiplicity of constitutional decisionmakers, it is apparent that Tribe's diffuse analysis 
of all constitutional problems is a theory of how constitutional decisionmaking does and should 
operate in a hardly unitary world. 
1416 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1407 
schools. This subject, however, is but a subset of what might be called 
"Constitutional Law" in any other context. The book excludes consti-
tutional criminal procedure, constitutional civil procedure, and the 
constitutional aspects of a wide variety of subjects covered in other law 
school classes. Moreover, as I have said, the book's treatment of 
Supreme Court cases and the secondary literature is far heavier than 
its treatment of lower court cases, and it is addressed far more to the 
lawyer or the judge than to other governmental decisionmakers. But 
finally, and most importantly, the book reflects existing constitutional 
conventions by conflating the very distinction I drew at the outset of 
this review. It is written by someone who is simultaneously a major 
constitutional scholar at a leading American law school, the preemi-
nent constitutional litigator in the country, and a widely known public 
commentator on constitutional issues. The book's description is glued 
to its prescription, such that almost all of what the book contains is, in 
one way or another, an argument for an approach that American 
courts, especially the Supreme Court, ought to adopt. Tribe speaks as 
a participant in the system, and uses, almost exclusively, the methods 
of the lawyer to comment on the law. And if at times perspectives 
from other disciplines, whether history or philosophy or economics, 
creep in, then that too is what we would ·expect in today's world of 
constitutional law. 
Because it is addressed to the constitutional scholar as much as to 
the constitutional lawyer or judge, and because its author is both a 
practitioner of and a commentator on the discipline, this book repre-
sents and comments on a domain in which the distinction between the 
internal and the external, between the participant and the observer, 
has collapsed. In the final analysis, this book exists within constitu-
tional law, not at an angle to it. It is a masterful exercise in a tradi-
tion, and it embodies in many respects the best of that tradition. Yet 
the book also ought to be taken as a warning, a warning about what 
the discipline is becoming. If academic institutions have value, it is in 
part because they are at an angle to society, and at an angle to the 
phenomenon they wish to explain. Their virtue exists in their ability 
to say those things that cannot be said by more immediately accounta-
ble primary participants. But if the distinction between the participant 
and the observer collapses, and the observer aspires to have her obser-
vations taken into account by today's decisionmakers, there may be no 
room for those who would stand outside, willing to exchange immedi-
ate impact for long-term understanding. 
The phenomenon I describe may be lessening. The interdiscipli-
nary nature of much of contemporary legal scholarship, for example, 
makes it less likely that our words will be directed to or heard by those 
whose primary expertise is in, and only in, law. Moreover, I can say 
with some confidence that the Supreme Court in 1991 will be further 
politically from the constitutional professoriate in 1991 than the 
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Supreme Court was from the constitutional professoriate in 1968. If 
the Justices are less inclined to listen, maybe constitutional scholars 
will be less inclined to talk directly to them. 
None of this is to fault Tribe or the spectacular accomplishment 
his book represents. "Tribe on Constitutional Law" represents a world 
in which, in one form or another, and for better or for worse, the mode 
of the scholar/participant is overwhelming. That mode has its place, 
and maybe even the major place. But when it is difficult to separate 
the discipline from commentary on it, when it is difficult to separate 
the players from the critics, something is lost. It is not lost to constitu-
tional law now, for the practice of constitutional law has been greatly 
enriched by academic input. That enrichment, though, may have 
come at some expense to the ideal of the academy, for without the 
external perspective the ability to say those things that cannot other-
wise be said is lost. This book is a masterwork of a perspective that is 
largely internal to the practice it seeks to explain and justify. But as 
such, it is also a warning to a discipline that may not recognize that 
the internal is not the only perspective there can be. 
